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Poisoning the Well to Save the WaterBy George Ziemann -- Dec. 1, 2005 You've gotta hand it to Sony. Who would have expected it? The most recent act was an award-winning stunt -- a stroke of marketing genius. They poisoned the product they were supposed to be selling in the first place. The only thing I can compare it to is the plot of the first Batman movie because I've never seen anything like it in real life. On the other hand, the Joker used a product that people would actually need, like shampoo or something. I think his plan actually worked better, too. Sony put spyware on their CDs, instantly and magically turning the "legitimate" product the least desirable option to obtain music. Knowing that the RIAA members collude more than they compete, one can only imagine what they'll think of next. Some already have. The lessons this provides for our edification are numerous, as is usually the case when the RIAA speaks. The first observation to be made concerns consistency in your public message, especially should you choose to lie instead of admitting you screwed up big time. On Nov. 18th, the RIAA's Cary Sherman, speaking at a CP NewsLink conference with college journalists, made the following statement:
The RIAA wants you to believe this, so much so that there is a copy of it on their site. Before they read this and change it, please note that it is a transcript from 2005 which first appeared at the CP NewsLink website. It bears a copyright notice which reads: "Copyright ©2003 Recording Industry Association of America". Without time travel, I don't think so. "The problem with the SonyBMG situation is that the technology they used contained a security vulnerability of which they were unaware." Obviously another typo. We all know that the RIAA does not consider this to be an acceptable defense. All of the RIAA lawsuits are against people who used a technology containing a security vulnerability of which they were unaware. Otherwise, the RIAA wouldn't have caught them. Which reminds me -- No new lawsuits announced in November. Coincidence? I'm sure Sherman meant to say, "The problem with the SonyBMG situation is that the technology they used contained a security vulnerability that the public was not supposed to be aware of." This is much more in line with Thomas Hesse's "why should anyone care" response to initial criticism. As Hesse also said, most people don't know what a rootkit is. The tricky part of that statement is that those who not only do know what it is also know why they shouldn't use it. Unless he's including himself in the group of most people who don't know. "They have apologized for their mistake, ceased manufacture of CDs with that technology, and pulled CDs with that technology from store shelves. Seems very responsible to me." It would be, if that was what happened. I saw a "regret the inconvenience" statement somewhere. I'm sure they do, but that's not an apology. Sony released two patches (both reportedly more damaging than what it was trying to remove), offered to temporarily cease manufacture, and the CDs are still on the store shelves. "How many times [have] software applications created the same problem? Lots." Yeah, but it's a new trick for an audio CD. I'm still trying to figure out when the standard for audio CDs was modified to add software in the first place, much less malicious software that opens the door for unexpected visitors. The big losers are, as always, the artists. I don't imagine there will be a lot of excess royalties that trickle down to Santana or Neil Diamond from a recalled CD laced with spyware. Or any of the other 50 or so artists fortunate enough to be part of this experiment. It's a good day to be independent. Corrections
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